By Dr. Cathy J. Cohen (GenForward Survey), Tabitha Decker (Next100), Chantal Hinds (Next100), and Kumar Ramanathan (GenForward Survey)
The 2024 election is taking place during a pivotal moment for our country and democracy. Since the previous presidential election, the United States has experienced political violence, including an armed insurrection intended to stop the peaceful transfer of power and an attempt to assassinate a presidential candidate; growing polarization among the public; gridlock in Congress on numerous pressing issues; and Supreme Court decisions that have curtailed reproductive rights, criminalized poverty, ended affirmative action, and eroded the separation of powers, among many other distressing developments. The past four years have shaken the ground on which our country stands and raised questions about how voters—particularly younger voters and especially younger voters of color—will respond. In 2020, a surge of young adult voters,1 including record numbers of young adult voters of color, partly drove an election turnout that was higher than it had been in decades. They can similarly play a crucial role in the 2024 election.
Understanding how young people view our government and engage in political and civic life is critical not only for electoral politics but for the overall health of our democracy. Millennials are the largest living adult generation2 and the largest generation currently in the workforce. Together with Gen Z, they are the most racially and ethnically diverse generations in the history of this country,3 representing the present and future of our pluralistic, multiracial democracy.
Against that backdrop, Next100 and GenForward have teamed up to assess young adults’ (ages 18–40) civic engagement and political participation, their trust in government and government leaders, and their views on the state of our democracy and its potential. In May of this year, we conducted a survey of 2,089 young adults, with oversamples of Black, Latinx, and Asian and Pacific Islander young adults. Our survey and analysis comes as people of all backgrounds—and young people in particular—are increasingly fatigued and frustrated with the political system, distrust many of its democratic institutions, and are dissatisfied with the economy. Many of our survey findings reflect these prevailing concerns.
In order for democracy to fulfill its promise of equal rights, opportunity, justice, and freedom, it is essential that young people and young people of color are engaged, trust that the processes for choosing leaders and shaping laws are fair, and that their needs are reflected in policy and action—conditions that, unfortunately, are not being met in the eyes of many young people today.
Key Findings
In this report, we highlight key takeaways from our survey of young adults, with particular attention to the differences in their views across race, ethnicity, income, and gender.4 We also considered how race and gender intersect and, in the cases where we saw notable differences when looking at them together, we include those findings in our discussion.5 Unsurprisingly, those who are most marginalized and disempowered by our current policies reported lower levels of belief in the potential of democracy and lower levels of engagement. However, certain survey questions garnered more negative responses by white and wealthier respondents—for example, on feeling like government leaders can relate to the challenges communities like theirs face, or regarding trust in federal government leaders—perhaps stemming from a sense that they are “losing ground” relative to other groups.
→ Few young adults think democracy is working well and their feelings about its potential are mixed, with marginalized groups expressing faith at lower levels. One in three young adults (36 percent) are dissatisfied with how our democracy is working today, and a similar number are ambivalent (37 percent). There are mixed feelings about the potential of democracy as an effective form of government, with just over half (54 percent) of respondents agreeing that it has potential, and lower agreement among Black (42 percent) and Latinx (46 percent) respondents, people with incomes under $60,000 (46 percent), and women (49 percent).
→ There is some agreement among young adults regarding what is needed for a healthy democracy. Young adults highlighted five priorities: (1) equal access to education and information, (2) free and fair elections, (3) limiting the influence of money in politics, (4) equal protection under the law, and (5) housing and food affordability. Black young adults and those with household incomes under $60,000 ranked housing and food affordability as the second-priority issue.
→ Many young adults—especially Black and lower-income young people—don’t feel like they have equal rights, and trust in government is hovering around historic lows. One in every two Black young adults, 44 percent of young adults with household incomes under $60,000, and 40 percent of women don’t feel like they have the “full and equal rights and protections that others have in this country.” Across racial groups, few believe that leaders in government can relate to the challenges facing communities like theirs and trust in government is low, with less than a quarter of young adults saying they trust the federal government and only 29 percent saying they trust local governments.
→ Young adults have low levels of civic and political engagement, with less than one-third considering themselves politically active. Most young adults (68 percent) say they plan to vote in the upcoming presidential election, but enthusiasm about the candidates will likely shape how many actually do. Black and Latinx respondents are less likely to say that they will vote (at 56 percent and 60 percent, respectively), and Black respondents are more likely than other groups to say that they are unsure if they will vote in the fall (23 percent).6 In terms of non-voting engagement, just 12 percent of young adults said they had contacted an elected official in the last year and the same number indicated that they did community service. Generally speaking, Black, Latinx, and young adults with lower incomes participated less in the most common forms of civic engagement than white, AAPI, and young adults with higher incomes.
Results and Analysis
Takeaway 1: Few young adults think our democracy is working well; most are concerned about its future, with perspectives on its potential varying by race, income, and gender.
Perhaps not surprisingly, few young adults believe our democracy is working well, and many are ambivalent about its potential as an effective form of government. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1
Only about a quarter (26 percent) of young adults think democracy in the United States is working well. We saw only small variations across groups. Women were less likely to say democracy is working well (22 percent) than men (30 percent). More AAPI young adults (32 percent) think it’s working well than white, Black, and Latinx young adults with 24 percent, 26 percent, and 28 percent agreeing, respectively.
Meanwhile, three in five young adults (61 percent) say they’re concerned about the future of our democracy. Only one in ten young adults (10 percent) say they are not concerned. (See Figure 2.)
Figure 2
There was significant demographic variation regarding concern about democracy, with 69 percent of white and 62 percent of AAPI respondents registering concern versus 51 percent of Latinx and 48 percent of Black young adults. Sixty-eight percent of respondents with household incomes above $60,000 say they are concerned about the future of our democracy, compared with 55 percent with household incomes less than $60,000. Looking at gender and race together7 (not included in the figure), white women express concern at higher levels (70 percent), than AAPI, Black, and Latinx women (58 percent, 50 percent, and 47 percent respectively).
Despite the significant level of concern about our democracy, roughly half (54 percent) of young adults believe in democracy’s potential as an effective form of government. (See Figure 3.)
Figure 3
Belief in democracy’s potential was lowest among Black (42 percent) and Latinx young adults (46 percent), those with incomes under $60,000 (46 percent) and among women (49 percent). Looking at race and gender together (not included in the figure), we see the lowest belief in the potential of democracy among Black women (40 percent), Latinx women (40 percent), and Black men (44 percent). Belief in democracy’s potential was especially high among AAPI men, 73 percent of whom expressed agreement, followed by white men (60 percent), white women (55 percent), AAPI women (54 percent), and Latinx men (53 percent).
Given that Black, Latinx, and lower-income young adults have lower levels of belief in the potential of democracy to be effective, it’s not surprising that fewer members of these groups expressed concern about its future or its current functioning. Likewise, this helps explain our finding that white women expressed more concern about the future of democracy than Black and Latinx women.
That some young adults from marginalized groups are more ambivalent or skeptical about democracy’s potential makes sense in the context of one of our most alarming findings: half (50 percent) of Black young adults, 44 percent of young adults with household incomes under $60,000, and 40 percent of women feel like they do not have the “full and equal rights and protections that others have in this country.” (See Figure 4.) Looking at race and gender together (not included in the figure), Black and Latinx women are more likely to disagree that they have full and equal rights (54 percent and 48 percent) compared with white and AAPI women (36 percent and 37 percent).
Figure 4
It stands to reason that one’s experience of systemic racism—evident, for example, in the persistent racial wealth gap, injustice through the criminal legal system resulting in mass incarceration, and voter disenfranchisement—undermines one’s faith in democracy. That 40 percent of women don’t feel like they have the same rights and protections as others (compared with 31 percent of men) may be driven, at least in part, by the Supreme Court’s recent gutting of abortion rights. Black and Latinx women’s experience of not being afforded full and equal rights and protections reflects the intersecting impacts of systemic racism and sexism, and, in turn, sheds light on why these women are least likely to believe in the potential of democracy to be an effective form of government. The persistent exclusion and marginalization that some groups face are impediments to building a healthy, inclusive democracy.
When we asked respondents to identify the greatest threat to democracy from a list of options, Donald Trump was the most commonly identified (21 percent), consistent across race and income, with Joe Biden the third most common response (12 percent). However, there was variation by race, with 14 percent of white respondents, 12 percent of Latinx respondents, 8 percent of Black respondents, and just 4 percent of AAPI respondents listing Biden as the greatest threat to democracy. Biden is no longer running for a second term and we do not know where Democratic nominee Vice President Kamala Harris would rank on this list. (See Figure 5.)
Figure 5
Looking beyond individual office-seekers, most young adults rank two things as the biggest threats to democracy: (1) the influence of money in politics and (2) political polarization. There was relative consistency across demographic groups concerning these threats, with one notable exception: Black respondents identified racism as a top threat to democracy (with 9 percent identifying it as the greatest threat, second only to Donald Trump).
In addition, by almost a two-to-one margin, young adults don’t think the two-party system is working (22 percent agree the two-party system is working, while 42 percent disagree), with little difference across race and ethnicity, gender, or income.
What do young people see as the path forward? For starters, there is broad agreement around the most important factors for democracy to work well, namely: (1) free and fair elections; (2) equal access to education and information; (3) limiting the influence of money in politics; (4) equal protection under the law; and (5) housing and food affordability. There is minor variation among demographic groups on these priority issues: for example, housing and food affordability is the second priority issue for Black young adults and young people with household incomes under $60,000. (See Figure 6.)
Housing and food affordability are not always included on lists of what is needed to make democracy work well. Young people who are from or are proximate to communities where these basic needs are not always met may recognize housing and food affordability as fundamental to faith in and participation in democratic processes. Ensuring that everyone has access to these essentials not only improves quality of life but also creates the conditions for a more robust democratic system that supports the well-being and engagement of all citizens.
Figure 6
We also found broad agreement among young adults about the greatest issues facing their communities, with economic issues dominating the list. (See Figure 7.)
Figure 7
Similar numbers of young adults identified economic growth (11 percent), income inequality (11 percent), poverty (10 percent), homelessness (10 percent), and high taxes (10 percent) as the top concerns facing their communities. There was some variation based on race in what respondents cited as the greatest issue facing their community, with gun violence rising to the top for Black young adults, for example, and crime making the top five for Black (9 percent), Latinx (9 percent), and AAPI (9 percent) young adults.
While young adults haven’t given up on democracy entirely, there are major challenges ahead for leaders from government, institutions, and movements to restore faith and inspire confidence among the next generation. One step toward building that confidence is prioritizing and making tangible progress on the issues young adults cite as most important to their communities and for democracy, such as income inequality and economic growth, education, and free and fair elections.. By doing this, leaders can start to shift young people’s perception of democracy’s effectiveness. We believe success hinges on broad input and participation in the shaping of public policy, including elected leadership and a policy sphere that better reflects the diversity of our country.
Takeaway 2: The majority of young adults say they’ll vote in the upcoming presidential election, but enthusiasm about the candidates will be an important factor in determining how many actually will go to the polls.
Much has changed in the political landscape since our survey was conducted in May, most notably Vice President Harris replacing President Biden as the Democratic nominee for president. The survey results reflect young people’s feelings and enthusiasm about November’s election prior to these changes, which included strong interest in the election but a large group of young adult voters who lacked enthusiasm for the candidates. This may have changed after the switch in nominees, with positive implications for engagement.
Most young adults (68 percent) say they will probably or definitely vote in the upcoming presidential election. (See Figure 8.) For comparison, past GenForward surveys conducted at similar points before the 2022 and 2020 elections found that 62 percent and 65 percent of young adults said they planned to vote in the upcoming elections, respectively.8 Of course, self-reported intentions to vote are not predictive: people consistently overestimate their likelihood of voting when answering surveys.9 These figures should not be interpreted to predict turnout in the fall, but rather as providing a rough measure of interest in the election among young adults.
Figure 9
Our data indicate significant demographic variation in intention to vote, with 56 percent of Black respondents and 60 percent of Latinx respondents saying they will probably or definitely vote in November, compared to 74 percent of white respondents and 71 percent of AAPI respondents. Sixty-one percent of young adults with incomes under $60,000 say they’ll vote, compared with 76 percent of those with incomes over $60,000. Fifteen percent of young adults said they are unsure if they’ll vote, with higher uncertainty among Black respondents (23 percent) and respondents with incomes under $60,000 (20 percent).
As of May 2024, when the main candidates were Biden and Trump, young adults’ candidate preference and satisfaction with the candidates was markedly different than in 2020. In 2020, two out of three of respondents said they voted for Biden and one out of three said they voted for Trump, but in 2024, only one in three said they planned to vote for Biden this time around (33 percent) and just under one in three (31 percent) said they plan to vote for Trump in 2024 (roughly the same percentage who voted for him in 2020). When the race was headed by Trump and Biden, many young adults were dissatisfied with their choices: 34 percent said they supported a third-party candidate or “someone else.” (See Figure 9.) It remains to be seen if and how the new matchup will reshape the actions and choices of young adult voters.
Figure 9
Of the 11 percent who said they definitely or probably won’t vote in the upcoming presidential election, one in three expressed dissatisfaction with the candidates (20 percent indicated that the candidates don’t represent their political beliefs and ideas and 13 percent said “I do not like any of the candidates”). Another one in three indicated that they don’t see a point in voting (19 percent chose “I don’t think my vote matters” and 11 percent chose “I don’t think voting changes anything”). For the third of those who said their reason for not voting related to the current candidate choices, there’s now a chance that they will be energized by the entrance of a new Democratic candidate. (See Figure 10.)
Figure 10
Notably, economic concerns rise to the top of many young adults’ concerns ahead of the election. Inflation was the number one issue across racial and income subgroups. Economic growth was consistently in the top three concerns across demographic groups and income inequality was consistently issue four or five across groups. (See Figure 11.)
Figure 11
There was some demographic variation regarding the issue respondents identified as most important in this election. Abortion and reproductive rights rose to the top five only for women, white young adults, and those with incomes equal to or above $60,000. For AAPI respondents and white respondents, threat to democracy was in the top three important election issues. For Black respondents, gun violence was the fourth most important issue, at 6 percent. Immigration rose to the top five issues for Latinx respondents.
We do not know whether or how young adults’ perceptions of our democracy may be impacted by this election. There are reasons to be concerned, including the continued barriers to voting installed in many states and uncertainty about whether Republicans will accept the results of the election if Donald Trump loses. On the other hand, the potential to elect America’s first female president, and having a Black and AAPI candidate atop the Democratic ticket, may inspire their electoral participation and possibly renewed faith and enthusiasm in our democratic institutions among young people.
Takeaway 3: Young adults feel let down by, disconnected from, and skeptical of their government and government leaders.
Trust in government in the United States is near historic lows10: just under one in four (24 percent) of young adults expressed trust in the federal government. Our findings are consistent with other recent surveys and track with a trend of decreasing trust in government by young adults here in the United States and globally,11 and are not surprising given our finding that only a quarter of young adults believe our democracy is working well. (See Figure 12.)
Figure 12
There is modest demographic variation in levels of trust in government. Women, white young adults, and those with incomes under $60,000 expressed the lowest levels of trust in the federal government at 20 percent, 21 percent, and 22 percent agreeing, respectively. AAPI young adults expressed trust at a higher but still low level (37 percent agreed or strongly agreed) compared to respondents of other races and ethnicities. Black young adults were the only demographic group to express more trust in federal than local government.
A similarly low 29 percent of young adults expressed trust in local government. Here we see sizable demographic variation, with AAPI young adults expressing higher trust (43 percent agree or strongly agree) than white (30 percent), Latinx (28 percent), and Black (25 percent) respondents. Young adults with household incomes greater than $60,000 expressed higher trust in local government (35 percent) than those with incomes under $60,000 (25 percent) and men (33 percent) expressed more trust than women (27 percent)
Few young adults—only 15 percent—think federal government leaders can relate to the challenges their communities face. The assessment of local government leaders’ ability to understand what people are experiencing was better but still low, with one in three (33 percent) young adults agreeing that local leaders relate to their challenges. (See Figures 13 and 14.)
Figure 13
Figure 14
There is modest variation by race, with lowest agreement that federal leaders can relate to their community’s challenges by white young adults (12 percent) and women (12 percent) and only slightly higher agreement from Black (19 percent), Latinx (18 percent), and AAPI (17 percent) young adults. White young adults and repondents with incomes over $60,000 disagreed at higher levels (65 percent and 61 percent) than Black, Latinx and AAPI young adults and those with incomes under $60,000 (44 percent, 46 percent, 46 percent, and 51 percent, respectively). Fewer Black (27 percent) and Latinx (28 percent) young people, women (27 percent), and people with incomes under $60,000 (28 percent) agree that local leaders can relate to the challenges their communities face.
What should we make of our finding that white young adults had especially low trust in the federal government and low levels of agreement that federal leaders can relate to communities like theirs? In recent decades, white people’s trust in the federal government tends to drop below that of Black and Latinx adults when there is a Democratic administration in the White House,12 likely reflecting the influence of partisanship on trust in government and a feeling of losing ground to other groups. Looking at it another way, what might explain the slightly higher levels of trust in federal government by marginalized racial groups? Researchers interested in political trust and engagement theorize that when marginalized groups have some hope for the government to advance justice, their trust in government increases.13 This may explain the higher levels of trust in the federal government by Black, Latinx, and AAPI young adults, who may view the federal government, particularly under administrations that highlight addressing inequality as a priority, as a potential guarantor of their civil rights and liberties.
It’s clear that our political system isn’t working, including and especially for many of the people for whom it matters most. The distance respondents feel between themselves and elected leaders likely reflects the lack of results they see in public policy. We believe in the power of government, including as a driver of greater justice. A government focused on and making progress on the issues that matter to young adults would yield greater trust and more engagement, creating a virtuous cycle.
Takeaway 4: There is work to be done to expand and support young adults’ civic and political engagement.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the low levels of trust and mixed feelings about the potential of democracy noted above, we found low levels of civic and political engagement among young adults, with just 27 percent considering themselves politically active or engaged. (See Figure 15.)
Figure 15
Self-reported engagement was lowest among Latinx respondents and respondents with household incomes under $60,000.
When asked about types of civic engagement they had done in the past year, numbers were low, with just 12 percent of respondents having volunteered or done community service in the past year, for example, and the same number (12 percent) having contacted a public official in the past year. (See Table 1.)
Table 1
The most common forms of engagement among the types we asked about were: talking to family and friends about elections (45 percent) and expressing an opinion (40 percent). Notably, even these relatively low-effort, expressive activities didn’t clear the majority threshold among young people.
We saw some variation by race and ethnicity, income, and gender on the most common forms of engagement, with, for example, young adults with higher incomes being more likely to talk with friends and family about elections (51 percent), express their opinions (46 percent), and contact a public official (17 percent). Talking to friends and family about elections, expressing an opinion, and contacting an elected official was less common among Black young adults (40 percent, 34 percent, and 8 percent, respectively) and Latinx respondents (39 percent, 31 percent, and 7 percent, respectively) than white respondents (48 percent, 44 percent, and 15 percent). Men were less likely than women to talk to friends and family about elections (41 percent versus 49 percent), sign a petition (22 percent versus 31 percent), and engage in community service (9 percent versus 15 percent).
Only 6 percent of young adults said they attended a protest in the last year. This is a low figure, but not remarkably so. In 2020, which we might expect to be a peak for protest activity, 17 percent (of 18- to 36-year-olds) said they had participated in a protest.14 In other words, even in moments with comparatively high civic engagement and a context supporting mobilization, only a small overall number of young people actually take to the streets.
The numbers are low for “online engagement” as well, which is noteworthy given that Millennials and Gen Zers are thought to be comfortable and continuously online. Just 13 percent of respondents reported sharing or circulating news about recent political events on social media and only 4 percent joined a political group on a social networking site.
These numbers illustrate that politics, and political engagement, isn’t a priority for many young adults. One reason may be a lack of avenues for engagement and a shortage of organizations and leaders young adults find credible speaking to the issues they care about most.
It’s clear from our findings that there’s work to be done to encourage and support young adults’ political participation. We must foster an inclusive culture of civic participation and ensure that the voices of young adults, especially those from marginalized backgrounds, are heard and valued, and ensure that our government truly represents and serves all people instead of a privileged few.
Increased participation from young adults must be accompanied by leaders’ increased attention to the issues they care about. This can only happen when intentional space is made for young adults’ voices to be heard and respected, and issues surfaced. Programs like GenFoward that collect data highlighting the ideas, actions and preferences of young adults, especially young adults of color and Next100 that center the policy issues that are most important to those traditionally excluded from the policymaking process provide the needed infrastructure to make meaningful change.
Looking Ahead
These survey results should serve as both an alarm bell and a roadmap forward. America’s Millennials and Gen Zers are more diverse than ever, equipped with new technologies and committed to voice, equity, and justice. Their potential is unmatched, but it is being hamstrung today by political and economic systems that too often work against their interests—especially so for young people of color, those with lower incomes, and women. It should surprise no one that, as a result, younger generations have lost faith in government and democracy and are not very civically engaged. To put it plainly, if young adults are not happy with the state of democracy and are not engaging, it’s because no one is providing the support and systems to engage, or reasons to believe in it.
As the nation heads into a presidential election season that risks further alienating, frustrating, and demoralizing young people, civic and political leaders cannot simply view these groups as voting blocs to win over. Instead, they must focus their efforts on changing the political landscape, listening to young voices, and pushing an agenda that speaks to the issues that matter most to young voters. Only through such systemic efforts can government rebuild young people’s trust and restore their faith in a democracy that works for them and their communities. That’s not the work of any one campaign; it’s the work of all of us, collectively.
Those in the policy field—think tanks, government offices, and advocacy organizations, among others—have a role to play in strengthening democracy through engaging and focusing on the concerns and liberatory vision of historically excluded groups, especially marginalized racial and ethnic groups, people with low incomes, and women in policymaking. By changing by whom and how policy is made, centering the vision and expertise of those with the most at stake, we will be better positioned to develop stronger solutions and the power needed to advance them. Those who are closest to the problems are best positioned to craft the solutions, but sadly lived expertise isn’t given enough credence in the policy field as currently constructed. That has to change.
About Next100 and GenForward
Next100 is a public policy leadership development program and a think tank working to strengthen public policy by addressing the historical exclusion of individuals and communities from the policymaking table.
GenForward hosts the first of its kind, nationally representative, quarterly survey of 18-40 year-olds, with oversamples of Black, Asian, and Latinx young adults. Based on data collected through this survey, we assessed young adults’ civic engagement, their trust in government leaders, and their beliefs about the current function of and potential of democracy as an effective form of government.
Survey Methodology
The GenForward May 2024 survey is a project of Professor Cathy J. Cohen at the University of Chicago. Interviews were conducted with a representative sample from GenForwardSM, a nationally representative survey panel of adults recruited and administered by NORC at the University of Chicago.
A total of 2089 interviews were conducted during May 10 to 22, 2024 with adults ages 18–40 representing the fifty states and the District of Columbia, including completed interviews with 552 Black young adults, 424 Asian American/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander adults, 542 Latinx adults, 571 white adults, and 0 adults with other racial and ethnic backgrounds. The survey was offered in English and Spanish and via telephone and web modes.
The GenForward survey was built from NORC’s AmeriSpeak® Panel and from the Black Youth Project (BYP) panel of young adults recruited by NORC. Funded and operated by NORC at the University of Chicago, AmeriSpeak® is a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the US household population. Randomly selected US households are sampled with a known, non-zero probability of selection from the NORC National Frame and address-based sample, and then contacted by U.S. mail, telephone interviewers, overnight express mailers, and field interviewers (face to face). The BYP sample is from a probability-based household panel that uses an address-based sample from a registered voter database of the entire United States. Households were selected using stratified random sampling to support over-sampling of households with Black, Latinx, and Asian American/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander young adults. NORC contacted sampled households by U.S. mail and by telephone, inviting them to register and participate in public opinion surveys twice a month.
Of the 2089 total interviews in the GenForward May 2024 survey, 98.2 percent were completed by web and 1.8 percent by telephone. The survey completion rate is 14.5 percent. The weighted AAPOR RR3 panel recruitment rate is 21.6 percent and the weighted household panel retention rate is 78.8 percent, for a weighted AAPOR RR3 cumulative response rate of 2.5 percent. The overall margin of error is ±3.24 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level, including the design effect. Among subgroups, the margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level is ±5.79 percentage points for Black respondents, ±6.62 percentage points for Asian Americans/Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders, ±6.85 percentage points for Latinx respondents, ±4.94 percentage points for white respondents, ±4.77 percentage points for men, ±4.40 percentage points for women, ±4.58 percentage points for respondents with household incomes below $60,000, ±4.59 percentage points for respondents with household incomes equal to or above $60,000, ±9.99 percentage points for Black men, ±6.31 percentage points for Black women, ±9.59 percentage points for Asian Americans/Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islander men, ±9.16 percentage points for Asian Americans/Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islander women, ±10.50 percentage points for Latinx men, ±8.71 percentage points for Latinx women, ±6.96 percentage points for white men, and ±7.01 percentage points for white women.
To encourage cooperation, respondents were offered incentives for completing the survey that ranged from the cash-equivalent of $3 to $15.
The interviews from the two probability-based sample sources were combined for statistical weighting and analysis. The combined panel samples provide sample coverage of approximately 97 percent of the U.S. household population. The statistical weights incorporate the appropriate probability of selection for the BYP and AmeriSpeak samples, nonresponse adjustments, and also, raking ratio adjustments to population benchmarks. A post-stratification process is used to adjust for any survey nonresponse as well as any non-coverage or under- and over-sampling resulting from the study-specific sample design. The poststratification process was done separately for each racial/ethnic group and involved the following variables: age, gender, education, Census Region, and partisanship. The weighted data were used for all analyses unless otherwise noted.
Notes
- William H. Frey, “Turnout in 2020 election spiked among both Democratic and Republican voting groups, new census data shows,” Brookings Institution, May 5, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/turnout-in-2020-spiked-among-both-democratic-and-republican-voting-groups-new-census-data-shows/.
- See, for example, this generational analysis from the Pew Research Center: Richard Fry, “ Millennials overtake Baby Boomers as America’s largest generation,” April 28, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/04/28/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers-as-americas-largest-generation/.
- Richard Fry and Kim Parker, “Early Benchmarks Show ‘Post-Millennials’ on Track to Be Most Diverse, Best-Educated Generation Yet: A demographic portrait of today’s 6- to 21-year-olds,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/11/15/early-benchmarks-show-post-millennials-on-track-to-be-most-diverse-best-educated-generation-yet/.
- We note differences between demographic groups (race, income, gender) in the text when we find gaps that exceed the margin of error.
- Due to the smaller sample sizes of these intersectional subgroups (race and gender together, such as Black women, AAPI men), we report on differences only when they exceed 15 percentage points.
- Note that this survey was conducted in May, prior to Joe Biden stepping out of the race and Kamala Harris becoming the Democratic nominee
- Note that sample sizes in race and gender subgroups are small and therefore margins of error higher than single-demographic subgroups.
- See GenForward’s April 2022 and June 2020 surveys: “Data—The Road to the 2022 Midterms (April 2022),” https://genforwardsurvey.com/2022/06/14/april-2022-survey/ and “Data—Race, Ethnicity, and the Financial Lives of Young Adults (June 2020),” https://genforwardsurvey.com/2020/06/01/financial-lives/.
- For example, CIRCLE analyzed voter file data to estimate that 50 percent of young adults aged 18–29 voted in the 2020 election. In GenForward’s June 2020 survey, 61 percent of young adults in this age range said they would definitely or probably vote. See “Half of Youth Voted in 2020, An 11-Point Increase from 2016,” CIRCLE, April 29, 2021, https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/half-youth-voted-2020-11-point-increase-2016.
- In a review of levels of trust in government in the United States since 1960, Pew Research Center documented a decline, with low levels of trust beginning in the early 1990s and continuing to the present day. In 2023 they found trust levels that had only been lower once before (in 2011) and noted a slight increase this year. See “Public Trust in Government: 1958–2024, Pew Research Center, June 24, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024/.
- In 2020, researchers at the Bennett Institute for Public Policy at the University of Cambridge found that younger generations have become steadily more dissatisfied with democracy, both in absolute terms and when compared with older generations when they were at similar life stages. See “Youth and Satisfaction with Democracy,” Bennett Institute for Public Policy at the University of Cambridge, October, 2020, https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Youth_and_Satisfaction_with_Democracy-lite.pdf.
- Data from Pew Research Center illustrates this pattern. See “Public Trust in Government: 1958–2024, Pew Research Center, June 24, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024/.
- See Cary Wu, Rima Wilkes, and David C. Wilson, “Race & Political Trust: Justice as a Unifying Influence on Political Trust,” Daedalus 151, no. 4 (November 15, 2022), https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/151/4/177/113712/Race-amp-Political-Trust-Justice-as-a-Unifying.
- “Data—Politics 2020: Protest, Racism, and Policing (July 2020),” GenForward, https://genforwardsurvey.com/2020/08/01/politics-2020-protest-racism-and-policing/?question=Q1.
